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The recent global crisis has sparked interest in the relationship between income inequality, credit booms,
and financial crises. Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2011) propose that rising inequality
led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis in the US in the first decade of the 21st century
as it did in the 1920s. Data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000 suggest these are not
general relationships. Credit booms heighten the probability of a banking crisis, but we find no evidence
that a rise in top income shares leads to credit booms. Instead, low interest rates and economic expansions
are the only two robust determinants of credit booms in our data set. Anecdotal evidence from US
experience in the 1920s and in the years up to 2007 and from other countries does not support the inequality,
credit, crisis nexus. Rather, it points back to a familiar boom-bust pattern of declines in interest rates,


















1.  Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis in the U.S. has been attributed to a rise in inequality by several 
authors. In his 2010 book, Fault Lines, Raghuram Rajan argued that rising inequality in the past three 
decades led to political pressure for redistribution that eventually came in the form of subsidized 
housing finance. Political pressure was exerted so that low income households who otherwise would 
not have qualified received improved access to mortgage finance. The resulting lending boom 
created a massive run-up in housing prices which reversed in 2007 and led to the banking crisis of 
2008. 
Along these lines, Kumhof and Rancière (2011) study the links between inequality, credit and 
crises complementing the Rajan hypothesis with a DSGE model. In this model, rising inequality and 
stagnant incomes in the lower deciles lead workers to borrow to maintain their consumption growth.  
As these households become increasingly indebted, they continue to borrow more to maintain their 
consumption. This increases leverage, and eventually a shock to the economy leads to a financial 
crisis. They posit that their story holds both for the 1920s stock market boom in the US and the run 
up to the 2008 crisis. The focus on income inequality by Kumhof and Rancière and Rajan is a novel 
approach to understanding macroeconomic outcomes prior to the recent financial crisis, and to the 
Great Depression. The theme deserves further empirical scrutiny from other time periods and 
countries. 
There is reason to wonder about the generality of this new view since income inequality 
rarely plays a significant role in the large literature on financial instability and credit booms. Mendoza 
and Terrones (2008) study the experience of a large number of advanced and emerging economies 
since the 1960s finding that current account deficits, strong economic growth and fixed exchange 
rates accompanied credit booms. Borio and White (2003) have also elaborated a view of pro-cyclical 
financial systems. Periods of expected low and stable inflation, strong economic growth and 
liberalized finance can give rise to complacency amongst borrowers, lenders and regulators. 
Endogenous market forces that might normally “rein in” these imbalances seem to be absent. 3 
 
Massive buildups in credit lead to financial instability in this case. Income inequality plays no active 
role in generating the boom-bust outcome in these contributions.  
In this paper, we present new empirical evidence on whether rising inequality has any 
explanatory power in accounting for credit booms and financial crises. Rather than limiting the focus 
to inequality as the Rajan/Kumhof/Rancière (RKR) frameworks do, we control for more traditional 
determinants of the credit cycle. Different from these authors, we also bring evidence from a much 
larger sample than the two unique periods in US economic history that are the focus of RKR. Our 
sample is a panel of 14 mainly advanced countries from 1920 to 2008 covering a wide variety of 
boom-bust episodes and financial crises.  
We find very little evidence linking credit booms and financial crises to rising inequality. 
Instead, the two key determinants of credit booms are the upswing of the business cycle or 
economic expansion and low interest rates. This is very much consistent with a broader literature on 
credit cycles.  While inequality often ticks upwards in the expansionary phase of the business cycle, 
this factor does not appear to be a significant determinant of credit growth once we condition on 
other macroeconomic aggregates. Neither is income concentration a good predictor of the financial 
crises that often follow above average growth in credit. The anecdotal evidence from several 
historical credit booms finds little support for the inequality/crisis hypothesis.  
Section 2 reviews the literature on the link between inequality, credit booms and financial 
crises. Section 3 presents evidence on the credit boom/financial crisis linkage. Section 4 takes one 
step back to explore the determinants of credit booms. Here we examine inequality and other 
determinants of credit growth. Section 5 discusses our findings within the context of historical 
narratives. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Income Inequality, Credit Booms, and Financial Crises 
 
Since the 1970s income concentration has increased dramatically in the US and several other 
nations. Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) focus on the rapidly rising share of pre-tax income 
amongst the top 1% of tax units since the 1980s that is marked in several nations such as the US and 
the UK. Many other studies have confirmed the stagnating wages and incomes for the lower deciles 4 
 
in the US and the fact that the median wage for US male workers has not risen since 1973 (e.g., 
Goldin and Katz, 2008). Rajan (2010) attributes rising income inequality in the U.S. since the 1970s 
largely to problems in the education system.
1 
 Rajan’s argument builds on the evidence in Goldin and Katz (2008) which shows that public 
education has failed to provide the type of training skilled workers required to keep up with 
advances in technology. This deficiency is reflected in the  incomes of the highly educated that are 
rising relative to the incomes of the majority of the less educated whose incomes have barely risen 
since the 1980s in real terms–a rising college premium over secondary school. Goldin and Katz 
document declines in graduation rates in high school and in college. They argue that this reflects the 
lack of access by those of low to moderate income to quality education.  
According to Rajan, the trend rise in inequality in the U.S. in recent decades, as in earlier 
episodes such as the social turmoil at the beginning of the twentieth century, (e.g., strikes, 
anarchism, the IWW, the progressive movement) and then in the 1930s (e.g., the rise of American 
communism, Coxey’s army of the unemployed and major strikes) led to a demand for political 
intervention. Ostensibly, the goal was to maintain the growth of consumption for the middle class. 
But unlike in the 1930s, the polarized political system today (e.g., McCarthy et al., 2006) has not 
been able to use the tax system to redistribute income or to fix the education system. Instead, it is 
alleged the US political system found it much easier to provide cheap credit for housing. The 
process relied on government intervention in housing markets as well as financial innovation and de-
regulation.  
In the US, government involvement in the housing markets is largely via the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) and the GSEs -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The FHA and 
Fannie Mae have their roots in the 1930s (Freddie Mac in the 1970s), and were set up to encourage 
the development of the mortgage market and to provide housing finance to much of the population. 
Rajan argues that as rising inequality and stagnant incomes became apparent in the early 1990s, 
successive administrations and Congress pushed for affordable housing for low income families 
using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as instruments for redistribution. In 1992 the Federal Housing 
Enterprise Safety and Soundness Act encouraged HUD to develop affordable housing and allowed 
                                                            
1 Other factors such as the decline of unions, immigration, globalization, reductions in the top marginal tax rates, and 
deregulation are given less weight. 5 
 
the GSEs to reduce their capital requirements. This according to Rajan (2010, p. 35), led the 
agencies to take on more risk. Lending was encouraged, and rising prices raised the GSE’s profits 
leading to more lending. The Clinton administration encouraged the GSEs to increase their 
allocations to low income households and urged the private sector “to find creative ways to get low 
income people into houses” (Rajan, 2010 p. 36). The FHA in the 1990s also took on riskier 
mortgages, reduced the minimum down payment to 3%, and increased the size of mortgages that 
would be guaranteed. The housing boom came to fruition in the George W. Bush administration 
which urged the GSEs to increase their holdings of mortgages to low income households (Rajan, 
2010 p. 37). Between 1999 and 2007 national home prices doubled according to the widely followed 
S&P/Case Shiller repeat sales index. The FHFA house price index shows a 75 percent rise between 
1999 and 2007. Either index demonstrates that house prices grew much faster than their long run 
trend during these years. 
The private sector also joined the party as they recognized that the GSEs would backstop 
their lending (Rajan, 2010 page 38). During this period, lending standards were relaxed and practices 
like NINJA and NODOC loans were condoned. These developments led to the growth of subprime 
and Alt A mortgages which were securitized and bundled into mortgage backed securities and then 
given triple A ratings which contributed to the financial fragility.  Mortgage backed securities (MBS) 
were further repacked into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Credit default swaps (CDS) 
provided insurance on many of these new products. Financial firms ramped up leverage and avoided 
regulatory oversight and statutory capital requirements with special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and 
special investment vehicles (SIVs).  
In this view, the financial crisis is directly linked to the explosion in credit and the inequality 
that drove it. Extending loans to low income households worked to increase home ownership in the 
short-run. At the same time, capital gains on real estate enhanced the amount of home equity and 
turned houses into ATMs via home equity credit lines. Ultimately the lending was deemed to be 
fundamentally unsound. Once housing prices began to decline in 2006 and 2007, the stage was set 
for the subprime mortgage crisis. SIVs faced liquidity runs due to their maturity mismatch problems. 
Correlated defaults overwhelmed the quality of the lower tranches of MBSs and CDOs and the 
leverage that begat high returns led to fires sales of all assets. CDS insurance exposure rendered AIG 
insolvent in this market. Further, the lack of transparency for investment bank balance sheets and 6 
 
uncertainty about Federal Reserve and government liquidity support led to a total collapse in the 
intermediation system.  
Rajan concludes that the government had good incentives to deal with rising inequality “but 
the gap between government intent and outcomes can be very wide indeed, especially when action is 
mediated through the private sector… On net, easy credit, … proved an extremely costly way to 
redistribute income” (Rajan, 2010 p.44). Rajan  also does not provide extensive direct evidence that 
the government deliberately chose cheap credit for housing to deal with rising inequality, but he 
states that:  
“… it is easy to be cynical about political motives but hard to establish intent, especially when the 
intent is something the actors would want to deny—in this case using easy housing credit as a 
palliative… it may well be that many of the parts played by the key actors was guided by the 
preferences and applause of the audience, rather than by well thought out intent. Even if the 
politicians dreamed up a Machiavellian plan to assuage voters with easy loans, these actions—and 
there is plenty of evidence that politicians pushed for easy housing credit—could have been 
guided by the voters they cared about… whether the action was driven by conscious intent or 
unintentional guidance is immaterial to its broader consequences.” (Rajan, 2010 p. 39).2 
 
Kumhof and Rancière (2011) develop a DSGE framework to complement the Rajan 
hypothesis. They take as stylized facts the correlation between rising inequality and credit growth in 
the U.S. both in the 1920s before the 1929 stock market crash and in the recent period. In both 
periods, there was a sharp increase in the incomes commanded by the top 1 per cent of the income 
distribution and a rapid increase in the household sector’s debt to income ratio. In both instances, 
they argue that higher credit was an equilibrium outcome. Lower deciles use debt in a bid to 
maintain real consumption growth that is temporarily below trend while the richest households 
accumulate claims on these low income households. Meanwhile, the growth in credit and higher 
leverage in the financial and household sector heightens the possibility of a systemic financial crisis. 
This model which has a marked similarity to the one pioneered by Michal Kalecki (1990) has 
two classes; the rich who own the capital who save invest and consume, and the rest (labor) who 
earn wages, do not own any capital and consume their wages plus the proceed from any borrowing. 
                                                            
2 In a similar vein to Rajan, Stiglitz (2009) hypothesized that in the face of stagnating real incomes, households in the 
lower part of the distribution borrowed to maintain their living standards leading to an unsustainable credit boom. 
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Kumhof and Rancière assume habit formation so that agents have a minimum level of consumption 
they need to attain.  
Workers and the rich bargain for the surplus created by production, and so consumption for 
workers depends on bargaining. When a bargaining shock hits, real wage growth declines, real wages 
fall below their steady state level and workers borrow to maintain their consumption in the face of 
their falling incomes. The rise in income inequality is driven by a shock that reduces the bargaining 
power of the workers relative to capitalists. In this case, the rich lend some of their income which 
they save to the workers via financial intermediaries which they own. Even as the poor become 
increasingly indebted, they continue to borrow to maintain their standard of living. It is assumed that 
the probability of a crisis depends positively on leverage. When a crisis occurs the lending boom 
stops. In this model, the authors present sufficient conditions within a micro-founded equilibrium 
model linking rising inequality, credit booms and financial crises. 
  At least two alternative views of credit booms and financial crises exist. In contrast to the 
ideas surveyed above, income inequality has not typically been seen as a standard driver of credit 
growth in either of these. The first of these covers a range of macroeconomic indicators. Mendoza 
and Terrones (2008) illustrate how these forces matter in a data set covering 49 credit booms in 48 
advanced and emerging countries between 1960 and 2006. During such booms, countries are likely 
to experience economic expansions, real exchange rate appreciation, capital inflows/current account 
deficits, and asset price booms.
3 In industrial economies, financial reform has also been a strong 
correlate of credit booms. Mendoza and Terrones also confirm that credit booms are a strong 
predictor of financial crises. 
In a prescient essay, Borio and White (2003) argued that financial instability could be an 
outcome of strong credit growth and large financial imbalances. This would be particularly so when 
expectations for inflation were low and monetary policy sought to fight inflation but accommodated 
(i.e., did not react to) asset price booms. The drivers of these imbalances differ radically from the 
                                                            
3 Menodza and Terrones note that not all business cycle expansion phases are accompanied by credit booms but that 
when credit booms occur the economy is likely to be growing above trend. Credit also appears to have its own cycle. 
This is in contrast to RKR which seem to focus on longer term trends. It would be difficult to reconcile trend inequality 
with cyclical credit. On the other hand inequality does seems to have a cyclical component  according to Barlevy and 
Tsiddon (2006). Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) also show that top incomes are correlated with periods of 
economic expansion. 8 
 
RKR frameworks. In fact, Borio and White tie into an older view of business cycles originating with 
A.C. Pigou, Irving Fisher, and Hyman Minsky amongst others.  
  In Borio and White’s synthesis, financial liberalization since the 1970s has interacted with the 
monetary policy environment and low expected inflation since the mid-1980s to create boom-bust 
cycles. Cross country data reveal a rising frequency of banking crises compared to the 1950-1972 
period and a large number of boom-bust episodes for equity prices and credit growth since the 
1980s in the leading (G10) countries.  They observe that the financial system in these countries is 
increasingly pro-cyclical owing to the fact that equilibrating mechanisms fail to ignite when asset 
prices are rising rapidly. Mainly they lay the blame on perceptions of risk and value which tend to be 
overly optimistic in boom episodes. Strong competition in financial markets only enhances these 
pressures to reach for yield. Increasing leverage, when feasible with regulatory standards also is a 
product of the process, and increases the fragility of the system in the event of a systemic shock. 
Borio and White note that credit booms can occur in periods of low and stable inflation. 
Often these periods arise when monetary policy credibility is strong as it is has been in advanced and  
some emerging countries in recent decades. An additional feature is that monetary policy that is 
aimed exclusively at control of inflation may not be responsive to financial imbalances in the 
absence of inflation.
4 This is not an intuitive process for those most familiar with standard 
equilibrium models of the business cycle.  In these mainstream models, demand pressures should 
lead to inflation and a monetary reaction to such inflation. The economy returns quickly to 
equilibrium after the monetary shock. Contractionary monetary policy in such models would also 
limit asset price growth and financial excess (Bernanke and Gertler, 2000). 
 Borio and White’s view is one of a cumulative process that is out of equilibrium. They cite a 
number of factors that allow inflationary pressures to be limited during credit booms. In such a case 
monetary intervention is not forthcoming from a central bank focused on short-run price pressures. 
Expectations of monetary policy credibility and stable inflation can lead actors to believe that 
recessions induced by monetary tightening will be less likely since limiting rising inflation is the 
monetary objective. Workers and consumers have balance sheets that improve in the boom and they 
may be able to easily sustain consumption growth with credit rather than demanding wage 
                                                            
4 The corollary is that monetary policy that leans against the financial wind can stop a credit boom. For a related 
argument see Bordo and Jeanne (2002). 9 
 
increases.
5 Firms’ accounting profits can improve in times of high asset prices leading to “more 
aggressive pricing strategies”. The prediction from Borio and White is that economic booms and 
accommodating monetary policy can give rise to large run-ups in credit and asset prices.  
The recent literature on credit booms thus posits several hypotheses.  One view argues that 
rising inequality fosters credit booms.  Alternative views suggest that credit booms are: pro-cyclical; 
more likely when monetary policy reacts largely to short-term inflationary pressures; associated with 
financial sector liberalization and competition. All of these views share the conclusion that credit 
booms can heighten the probability of a financial crisis. In what follows, we ascertain whether the 
evidence from a panel of 14 countries over the last 100 years is consistent with either of these 
explanations for credit booms.  
We are not the first to make an effort in this direction. Atkinson and Morelli (2010) use a 
data set ranging from 1911 to 2010 and look for patterns of rising inequality prior to financial crises 
similar to that observed in the U.S. before 2007. Like Kumhof and Rancière they find evidence for a 
strong inverted V in the 1920s and 1930s. They also find a weaker pattern for the decade leading to 
the Savings and Loan Crisis in the late 1980s. Another case which they argue looks like the U.S. in 
the 1920s is Iceland preceding its 2007 crash. Still, their conclusion is that the overall evidence is not 
conclusive that financial crises are preceded by a run-up in income inequality. Moreover, Atkinson 
and Morelli do not explore the channel we are interested in which is that inequality drives a credit 
boom. Within their framework, they also do not allow for other determinants of credit booms and 
crises besides inequality. 
 
2.  Empirical Evidence: Credit as a Driver of Banking Crises 
 
To investigate the relationships outlined above, we employ a data set for 14 countries between 
1880 and 2008. The first relationship we explore is that between banking crises and credit expansion. 
The theoretical frameworks outlined above all agree there is a positive relationship between these 
two outcomes, and a large amount of recent research confirms this relationship empirically. We 
                                                            
5 This points out a possible mechanism for inequality to be a by-product of a credit boom rather than a cause. If workers 
are induced to limit wage demands, but creditors, capitalists, and rentiers take capital gains and benefit from the financial 
and economic expansion inequality might rise during the boom. 10 
 
investigate it and confirm it in our data set for illustrative purposes. We then move on to examine 
the determinants of credit growth including income inequality as well as other variables discussed 
above.  
Borio and Lowe (2002) found evidence that credit booms since the 1970s were associated with 
financial instability. Menodza and Terrones (2008) note that many, but not all credit booms are 
followed by banking crises. Schularick and Taylor (forthcoming) go beyond the last few decades and 
study the long-run evidence. Their data on credit growth, which we rely on here, span the years 1889 
to the present covering the most economically advanced countries. They also find a similar positive 
empirical relationship. In their work, Schularick and Taylor estimated the probability of a systemic 
banking crisis as a function of credit growth using an estimating equation similar to the following: 
 
   Pr Banking	Crisis   f   ∑   Δln	  Credit    
   	               
 
The  symbol denotes the annual change, credit is proxied by the ratio of Schularick and 
Taylor’s bank loans variable deflated by the local consumer price index,    is a set of country fixed 
effects which are included in the linear models,    is a set of time period indicator dummies, and     
is an idiosyncratic error term for each country in each period. We estimate this model with a linear 
probability model and alternatively with a logit model without country fixed effects. The lag length, 
P, is set to 5 as in Schularick and Taylor.
6  
Schularick and Taylor’s credit variable is defined as the amount of outstanding domestic 
currency loans made by domestic banks to domestic households and non-financial corporations.  
They assume that bank loans is a reasonable proxy for total credit, but this might not be true if 
substantial amounts of financial liabilities are financed by non-banks. Many types of obligations 
generated in the equity, bond or derivative markets are not included in this data set. What constitutes 
a bank and which types of banks reported their lending depends on the country and the time period.  
In the absence of more comprehensive data for the long run, we follow them in using bank loans as 
                                                            
6 The sample for banking crises covers the following countries and years: Australia (1880-2008), Canada (1880-2008), 
Denmark (1891-2008), France (1886-2008), Germany (1889-2008), Italy (1880-2008), Japan (1894-2008), Netherlands  
(1906-2008), Norway (1880-2008), Spain (1906-2008), Sweden (1880-2008), Switzerland (1912-2008), United Kingdom 
(1886-2007), and the United States (1902-2008). 11 
 
a good proxy for credit. Schularick and Taylor also argue that despite changes in data coverage over 
time and across space, that time series variation is meaningful, so we follow their approach and 
always use country fixed effects and/or focus on changes in levels.  
 A banking crisis is coded as a binary indicator variable. These data are from Bordo, 
Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001) and were updated for 2001-2008 using the data 
underlying Schularick and Taylor (forthcoming). Banking crises involve systemic panics, widespread 
failures in the banking industry, and large losses to the capital base of the domestic banking system. 
Banking crises can last multiple years if, for instance, restructuring in the banking sector continues 
over time and losses last for several years, or re-capitalization does not occur immediately. We 
include subsequent years after the first year of a crisis but our results are qualitatively robust to using 
only the first year of a crisis as our dependent variable. 
Table 1 presents results for the models and sub-samples. Overall there is a strong positive 
relationship between real credit growth and the probability of having a banking crisis. Although real 
credit growth lagged one year is associated with a lower probability of a crisis, credit growth from 
two to five years earlier is strongly positively related to a crisis. The sum of lag coefficients in 
column 1 is 0.487. In the linear probability model, the sum of coefficients implies that a sustained 
five year period rise of one standard deviation or 0.10 log points in real bank loans would be 
associated with a rise in the probability of a banking crisis of 0.049. The results are somewhat larger 
if we use the logit specification from column 2. Here a rise in the growth of real credit from 0.05 to 
0.15 (roughly one standard deviation above the mean) would raise the predicted probability by 0.15. 
For the sample that is restricted to the post-World War II period, the impact is slightly smaller. Here 
there is a rise in the probability of 0.06 when the mean growth of credit rises from its mean of 0.04 
by one standard deviation to 0.10. These results are in line with Schularick and Taylor and the 
literature on credit booms surveyed above. They pave the way to thinking about the fundamental 
drivers of credit growth. 
4.  Credit Growth Determinants 
In this section we explore the cross-country relationship between the growth in credit and 
other macroeconomic aggregates. Our dependent variable is credit growth, and the set of 
independent variables includes income concentration as well as some of the more traditional 
variables included in Mendoza and Terrones and Borio and White.  12 
 
The goal here is to provide a simple econometric test of the hypothesis that credit growth 
has no relationship to changes in income concentration after conditioning on other factors. The 
alternative hypothesis, discussed above, is that income inequality or top income concentration drives 
credit growth even after controlling for other macroeconomic variables. Again, there is strong 
evidence, based on our priors and previous research, that there is a relationship between credit 
growth and the business cycle and other macroeconomic aggregates. There is also some evidence 
that changes in inequality are related to these cyclical variables. Whether changes in inequality matter 
once we control for these variables is then a question for the data. 
4.1 Time Series Plots of Credit and Top Incomes 
Time series plots of the growth in credit (i.e., the change in the log ratio of bank loans to the 
price index) and of changes in the share of income for the top 1% for seven different country/time 
periods are presented in Figures 1 and 2. For the US, we look at the following periods: 1924-1929, 
1993-2000 and 2004-2007. All three seem to be suggestive of a positive relationship between credit 
growth and rises in top income shares. Of course, the economy was in full expansion during the 
bulk of these periods, so that an alternative view might simply be that general economic expansion 
generates these co-movements. There are only a limited number of examples from other countries 
that support the idea that income concentration drives credit. Sweden from 2003-2008 might also be 
consistent with the US case between 2004 and 2007.  
Despite these examples, there are many cases that do not fit the RKR frameworks. In Japan 
in the 1980s, credit growth clearly rises in advance of top income shares. On the other hand, top 
income shares started rising in 1995 in Japan while credit growth languished. In Sweden, sharp rises 
in top incomes followed, rather than led credit growth in the 1980s. Again, in Sweden, top income 
shares continued to grow in the aftermath of the banking and real estate bust in 1991 while credit 
fell. In Australia, credit growth was unrelated to top income shares in the 1970s. Top income shares 
follow rather than lead credit growth in the late 1980s in Australia. The UK shows similar patterns 





4.2 Econometric Models of Credit Growth 
We next investigate the determinants of changes in credit in a single equation regression 
framework.  Formally we run regressions of the following form: 
Δln	  Credit    Δ       
    	               
The dependent variable in our models is the growth in the (log) level of real credit.  The k x 1 vector 
X includes the share of income of the top 1%, the log of Real GDP, an index of investment relative 
to the price level, the log of the ratio of M2 relative to the price level, and a short term nominal 
interest rate.  We also include the lagged value of the change in log real credit growth.  In annual 
regressions, we lag all of our explanatory variables by one year, as the equation indicates, to deal with 
simultaneity issues. The time period for the estimation sample runs from 1920 up to 2008.
7 Some 
data are available for credit for the period prior to World War I but only for a very limited set of 
countries and years. We begin with 1920 and omit the years of World War II. We are highly 
constrained by the availability of information on top incomes. These data become more widely 
available over time which makes the sample bulge in terms of “N” as time proceeds. To deal with 
this potential compositional issue, we present results from different sub-periods that have greater 
balance in terms of country coverage. 
Our proxy for income concentration and income inequality is the share of total income 
earned by the top 1% of individuals or households or tax units. This variable has been collected 
from personal tax returns for each country by various teams of researchers following the 
methodology of Piketty (2001). The data set we use for the post-World War II period was 
downloaded from “World Top Incomes Database” (http://g-
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/).  The income data themselves are constructed as 
the ratio of the top income earners’ incomes divided by the total amount of national income 
recorded. Income here includes labor, business and capital income before taxes and transfers. In a 
limited number of cases, realized capital gains are included in the income concept. There are some 
issues of comparability over time and across space in these top incomes data. In a few cases, as 
                                                            
7 The  sample in column 1 of Table 3 includes 14 countries for the following years: Australia (1931-1939 and 1972-2008), 
Canada (1937-1939 and 1958-2001), Denmark (1982-2006), France (1924-1938 and 1961-2007), Germany (1928-1937 
and 1962-1999), Italy (1976-2005), Japan (1920-1939 and 1959-2006), Netherlands  (1923-1939 and 1962-2000), Norway 
(1974-2008), Spain (1983-2008), Sweden (1921, 1936 and 1952-2008), Switzerland (1950-1996), United Kingdom (1960-
2008), United States (1921-1939 and 1950-2008). 14 
 
mentioned, capital gains are included in the income concept. The definition of the tax unit also 
varies by country and over time. Some issues in comparability over time due to changes in tax laws 
have also been highlighted by Piketty and Saez who provided the web-based interface for the World 
Top Incomes Database. Despite these caveats, we follow Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström (2009) 
and pool these data as a reasonable first pass at the key relationships.
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4.3 Credit Growth Determinants: Evidence from Five Year Periods 
Our first results rely on information from five-year periods as in Roine et. al. Annual volatility is 
significant in the data especially in the top income shares. Also this is an attempt to look at medium 
term trend relationships which is the horizon on which the RKR frameworks seem to be focused. 
An observation in this sample is thus the cumulative change over the previous five years for each 
variable. We restrict the sample to the endpoint of each quinquenium, and period dummies are 
included for each five year period to control for shocks. In these models, variables in the vector X 
are for the same five-year period. 
Table 2 presents four OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative growth 
over the previous five-years in the log of real credit. Column 1 includes only the cumulative 
percentage point change in the top income share as well as country fixed effects, time dummies, and 
growth in credit from the previous five-year period. While top income growth has a positive 
marginal effect, it is only significant at the 80 percent level of confidence. Column 2 adds the 
cumulative change in the log of real GDP over the previous five years to the model in column 1. 
Income growth is strongly related to credit growth. Again, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
top incomes have no association with the growth in credit. In column 3, we interact these two key 
variables. The reason is that the RKR hypothesis suggests that when total incomes and inequality are 
rising a credit boom arises in the bid to smooth consumption by the lower deciles. We find no 
evidence of such an impact with the interaction effect. Finally, column 4 controls for other 
macroeconomic fundamentals including the short-term nominal interest rate, the ratio of investment 
                                                            
8 We note that income inequality measures based on the Gini Coefficient or comparisons between the 90th and the 10th 
or the 50th percentiles are different from the top incomes variable which captures only one part of the distribution. For 




to GDP and the (log) real money supply (M2). The only variable that has a statistically significant 
relationship after inclusion of these controls is the growth of GDP. 
 From Table 2, the evidence is that the primary determinant of credit growth is real incomes. 
When GDP grows at a pace above its average, credit also rises above its average growth rate. We 
decisively reject any relationship between credit growth and changes in the share of income accruing 
to the top 1%. In unreported regressions, we found that no relationship existed between credit 
growth and the share of the top 0.01%, the top 5%, or the top 10%.  
 
4.4 Credit Growth Determinants: Annual Evidence 
Table 3 examines the relationship between credit growth and these determinants using 
annual data. Year-to-year variation provides another perspective and a robustness check on our 
results from Table 2. Once again, the annual data provide no evidence that growth in top income 
shares are a significant determinant of credit growth. In none of the specifications presented, or in 
the many which we leave unreported, do top incomes have any statistically significant relationship 
with credit growth. On the other hand, all specifications show a strong relationship between annual 
changes in GDP and credit growth.  
Table 3 also presents evidence from three different subsamples. The first three columns are 
for the 1920-2008 period, the fourth column is limited to the years between 1950 and 2008, and the 
fifth column is for 1972-2008 when international capital flows began to rise rapidly. The first three 
columns add progressively more explanatory variables to the long-run sample. Echoing results in 
Table 2, GDP growth is highly significant and positively related to credit growth. Figure 3 presents 
this relationship in a scatter plot. This figure plots the relationship between residuals from 
regressions of credit growth and income growth that condition on country and time fixed effects 
and all variables included in column 4 of Table 3. Here one gets a sense of how tight the conditional 
relationship is between changes in top incomes and changes in income growth. Given the standard 
error of the estimated relationship, there is less than a 1 in 1000 chance that this relationship is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero, while the 95% confidence band is 0.25 to 1.03. 
Table 3 shows that changes in the short-term nominal interest rate are also a significant 
determinant of credit growth. When short-term interest rates fall, credit growth rises. This result is 16 
 
also robust to using ex post real interest rates.  The relation between interest rates and credit seems 
to be consistent with the Borio and White story that low interest rates reflecting benign inflationary 
expectations can provide an environment favorable to creating a credit boom. It is also consistent 
with a simpler story emphasizing the role of loose monetary policy in fueling a credit boom. This 
result, together with the relationship between credit and income growth resoundingly rejects any role 
for income concentration.  
The negative relationship between interest rates and credit might also be consistent with a 
“savings glut” type of argument. An increase in the supply of savings drives interest rates down 
perhaps due to rising savings abroad or in the upper deciles. If the upper deciles were responsible 
for this rise, then it might be consistent with RKR. If so, then the top income share and interest 
rates should be strongly negatively correlated. There is no strong evidence for this notion. When we 
omit interest rates from column 1, the coefficient on top incomes rises to 0.0046 from 0.0042. The 
standard error hardly changes either.  
   As a robustness check, three other variables were included in Table 3: money growth, 
changes in the rate of investment relative to GDP and changes in the current account to GDP ratio. 
Mendoza and Terrones (2008) found that a rise in the current account deficit accompanied credit 
booms, but their sample included many emerging markets as well as leading countries. Our sample is 
limited to a subsample of the most developed countries. Here current account deficits have no 
significant relationship with credit growth.  
A long literature on credit booms argues that technological breakthroughs and displacements 
drive investment and these need to be financed with credit (Fisher 1933, Kindleberger 1978, Minsky 
1986). After controlling for the business cycle and the interest rate, we find no convincing evidence 
that higher investment is associated with credit growth. Money supply growth is also not associated 
with credit growth. This result is consistent with Schularick and Taylor (forthcoming) who observe a 
dwindling correlation between growth in the money supply and bank lending since World War II. 
According to them, this reflected financial innovation allowing banks to increase leverage and rely 
less on deposits for their funding. Overall, low interest rates and strong economic growth seem to 
be the most robust determinants of credit growth. 
 None of the econometric models we have deployed can reject the null hypothesis that top 
income shares have no relationship with changes in credit. Our cross-country evidence is also 17 
 
inconsistent with Kumhof and Rancière who argued that rises in inequality could give rise to credit 
booms and financial crises. The results in Table 1 show a high probability of a banking crisis after 
credit growth rises, but since top income growth is not a determinant of credit growth, income 
concentration is not associated with banking crises. Indeed, unreported regressions that include 
growth in top incomes in regressions like those of Table 1 show that income inequality is not a 
significant determinant of banking crises in our sample.  
 
5. Historical Evidence & Discussion 
  Recent literature has made the novel claim that income inequality in the US played a big role 
in driving the credit boom from 2002 and in the 1920s. Our cross country empirical evidence shows 
that there is no statistical relationship between income concentration and credit booms. In fact, 
historical evidence from the episodes in the US which are used to motivate RKR shows that income 
concentration may be only coincidental with these credit boom and bust episodes. Here we provide 
some anecdotal evidence in support of our findings above. 
   For the 1920s, time series for the US show that the share of income earned by the top 1% 
increased from 15% in 1922 to 18.42% in 1929. Research based on top-incomes, as well as early 
work by Williamson and Lindert (1980), identify this as a period of rising income inequality. 
However, this rise in income inequality does not seem to be associated with any stagnation in real 
wages for the working class. Indeed annual income of nonfarm employees rose grew at an average 
of 1.89 percent or a total of 23 percent between 1919 and 1929. In addition, rises in the standard of 
living must have been even greater. Leisure increased in this period as the standard work week fell to 
48 hours by 1929. The introduction of electrification, better indoor plumbing and a host of new 
consumer durables including automobiles, radio, washing machines and refrigerators, made home 
production more efficient and leisure more enjoyable.  
At the same time, as credit allegedly “boomed” in the 1920s, the economy grew largely 
above trend from 1923 up to 1929. Olney (1999) reports that consumer non-mortgage debt to 
income rose from 5.6% to 9.3% between 1923 and 1929. The ratio of individual and non-corporate 
debt to nominal income (this includes farm production credit, farm mortgages, non-farm mortgages, 
commercial, financial and consumer credit) increased between 1923 and 1929 from 63% ($53.7 18 
 
billion in credit and $85.1 billion in gross output) to 70.7% ($72.9 billion in credit versus $103.1 
billion in gross output).
9 The bulk of the rise in credit was attributable to non-farm mortgage lending 
which rose by $13.3 billion. Consumer credit doubled from $3.2 billion to $6.4 billion in nominal 
terms between 1923 and 1930 but the amounts were relatively small relative to total income. 
Eichengreen and Mitchener (2004) cite competition amongst lenders, monetary stability and 
improved housing quality as drivers of the housing boom.  
Eugene N. White (2009) delves further into the US housing boom of 1920-1926 
investigating demand, monetary policy, lending standards, mortgage securitization, risk-taking and 
supervision. Out of sample predictions of a demand for housing model account for a large portion 
of the rise in housing starts since demand had been repressed during the war, GDP was growing fast 
and interest rates were low. Still, the portion of housing starts left unexplained by this model is equal 
to ½ to 2/3 of annual average housing starts from 1900-1917. White concludes that monetary policy 
was somewhat too loose, but other important features of the boom were supply-side financial 
innovations including mortgage securitization, weakened supervision of lenders, lower lending 
standards and even corruption. White recounts that Florida politicians were “bought” by developers 
in order to achieve low supervision and easy charters. This version of the story is driven by the 
supply side rather than the demand side as in RKR. White is also emphatic that the housing bust did 
not impair the financial system or generate a banking crisis in 1926 nor was the housing boom and 
bust directly responsible for the banking crises of 1930, 1931-32 and 1933. There is little evidence 
that housing, which accounts for the bulk of the rise in household borrowing in the 1920s, was 
affected by the level of earnings inequality in the period.  
Consumer credit was closely related to the rise of new big-ticket consumer durables in the 
1920s. However, the rise in consumer credit also arguably came from supply side innovations rather 
than from a household demand to maintain consumption in the face of stagnant incomes. The 
historical record is not consistent with the RKR hypothesis in this regard. Olney (1989) 
demonstrates that a major driver of consumer credit for automobiles, an important component of 
overall consumer credit, was pressure from automobile manufacturers. Producers wanted retailers to 
carry the costs of the winter inventory buildup so that production could be smoothed and average 
costs could be lower. The solution was the advent of finance companies including GMAC that 
                                                            
9 While nominal credit aggregates peaked in 1929, the ratio of debt to GDP continued to grow up to 1933 due to the 
fact that nominal GDP declined by almost 50% between 1929 and 1933. 19 
 
innovated methods of extending credit to consumers. Often they did so by purchasing installment 
contracts from dealers. The original intent was not to “bolster retail sales but to finance dealer’s 
wholesale inventory” (Olney, 1989).  
On this basis it is very hard to generalize the RKR view even to the 1920s in the United 
States. There is simply no evidence of a political conspiracy to increase home-owning in the 1920s in 
the USA in order to win votes. Nor is there any evidence that the demand for credit rose in order to 
make up for lost income and lagging consumption.  Eichengreen and Mitchener (2004) dissect the 
1920s credit boom and suggest that the view of Borio and White is largely consistent with the cross-
country experience. In the US, but also in other nations, competition in the financial sector and 
accommodative monetary policy in the 1920s drove credit up during the boom and likely fed back 
into the economic cycle. The stock market crash in 1929 and the subsequent economic slump can be 
attributed to many causes but amongst them are the large financial imbalances that built up over the 
1920s which were cataclysmic for household balance sheets and aggregate demand due to the 
subsequent deflation (Mishkin, 1978 Olney, 1999).  
The experience of other countries that experienced major credit booms and subsequent 
financial crises is also not obviously consistent with RKR. Sweden had a credit boom following the 
liberalization of their financial sector in the 1980s. The other key factors leading to its systemic 
banking crisis in 1991 were capital inflows and an overvalued exchange rate (Jonung  et. al. 2009). 
Australia had a massive housing and credit boom in the late 1980s as well. Factors cited there were 
rapid financial de-regulation, excessive risk taking in the corporate sector and irrational speculation 
in the housing market (Macfarlane, 2006). Japan’s real estate boom in the 1980s was also fueled by 
expansionary monetary policy under pressure from the U.S. to weaken the Yen at the Plaza Accord 
of 1985 (Funibashi, 1989). Mullbauer and Murphy (1990) argued that the UK credit and 
consumption boom of the late 1980s was enabled by financial liberalization that allowed consumers 
to cash in on housing equity. An alternative story for the UK in the 1980s is that households 
anticipated an increase in lifetime labor incomes (Attanasio and Weber, 1994). None of these cases 
or points of view associates the credit and asset price booms with rising income inequality. Most of 
them witnessed declining interest rates or accommodative monetary policy, financial liberalization 
and economic expansion. 
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 6. Conclusions 
Our paper looks for empirical evidence that might corroborate Rajan (2010) and Kumhof 
and Rancière (2011). Both attributed the US subprime crisis to rising inequality, redistributive 
government housing policy and a credit boom. Using data from a panel of 14 countries for over 120 
years, we find strong evidence linking credit booms to banking crises, but no evidence that rising 
income concentration was a significant determinant of credit booms. Narrative evidence on the US 
experience in the 1920s, and that of other countries in more recent decades, casts further doubt on 
the role of rising inequality. 
We do find significant evidence that rising real income and falling interest rates are 
important determinants of credit booms. This evidence is more consistent with the alternative story 
of Borio and White (2003) attributing credit booms and crises in the past three decades to the Great 
Moderation which created a benign environment conducive to rising credit. It is also consistent with 
other empirical work that covers the period 1960-2002 (Mendoza and Terrones, 2008). The negative 
and significant relationship of short-term interest rates and credit growth may also be consistent 
with the story of for example Taylor (2009) or Meltzer (2010) who attribute the U.S. housing boom 
to expansionary policy by the Federal Reserve in the early 2000s in an attempt to prevent perceived 
deflation.  Moreover, housing booms and busts in other countries did not reflect redistributive 
housing policy. In the period before the Great Moderation they occurred during episodes of 
expansionary monetary policy. Regardless of whether the Borio and White story or a simpler 
monetary policy story is the true explanation for credit booms that lead to financial crises it now 
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Table 1 Relationship Between Banking Crises and the Growth in Credit, 1889-2008 
  OLS, 1889-2008  Logit 1889-2008  Logit 1889-1913  Logit 1920-1940  Logit 1950-2008 
          
 ln (Loans/CPI) t-1  -0.145**  -4.087**  -6.211 -1.164  -5.833* 
 [0.060]  [1.861]  [5.533] [2.718]  [3.410] 
 ln (Loans/CPI) t-2 0.167**  3.710**  0.399 5.329** 2.98 
 [0.076]  [1.445]  [3.828] [2.197]  [2.918] 
 ln (Loans/CPI) t-3 0.146**  3.316**  5.344 3.12 2.99 
 [0.053]  [1.546]  [6.613] [2.521]  [2.691] 
 ln (Loans/CPI) t-4  0.12  2.854**  -4.719 3.828*  4.685* 
 [0.096]  [1.432]  [3.836] [1.980]  [2.511] 
 ln (Loans/CPI) t-5  0.199***  3.448**  7.851* -0.115 3.729 
 [0.062]  [1.468]  [4.077] [2.241]  [2.306] 
          
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  yes  no  no  no  no 
Observations 1,490  609  67  167  375 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when a banking crisis occurred. The symbol  signifies an annual difference. Year fixed effects are included in 
all specifications. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. A number of years are omitted in the logit specifications since no countries 





Table 2 Credit Growth and the Share of Income of the Top 1 Percent, Five year periods between 1920 and 2008
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
      
 Top 1% Share  0.024 -0.003 0.011 0.015 
 [0.019]  [0.018]  [0.024]  [0.027] 
  ln(GDP/Capita)  --- 1.248***  1.204**  1.215** 
   [0.392]  [0.442]  [0.437] 
 Top 1% Share x   ln(GDP/Capita)  --- ---  -0.294  -0.294 
     [0.178]  [0.193] 
 Short term nominal interest rate  --- --- ---  -0.238 
       [0.487] 
 (investment/GDP)  ---  --- ---  -0.216 
       [0.563] 
 ln (Money/Price Level)  --- --- ---  -0.07 
       [0.313] 
  ln(Credit/Price Level) t-1  0.152 0.139 0.142  0.133 
 [0.144]  [0.101]  [0.102]  [0.097] 
Total Observations  115  115  115  115 
R-Squared 0.507  0.583  0.595  0.596 
Number of Countries  14 14 14  14 
Notes: Dependent variable is the cumulative change in the share of total income earned by the top percentile over the five years leading up to and 
including 1920, 1925, 1930, 1935, 1940, 1955, 1960, 1965,…,2005. Estimation is by OLS. Quinquennial period dummies are included in all 







Table 3 Explaining Changes in the level of ln(Credit/Price Level), Annual Data, 1920-2008
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual change in ln(Credit/Price Level). Estimation is by OLS. Year dummies are 
included in all regressions as are country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported throughout.  *** p<0.01, ** 












 Top 1% Share t-1  0.004 0.004  0.005  0.0002  -0.001 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]  [0.003] [0.002]
 ln(GDP) t-1  0.353*** 0.330***  0.450***  0.628***  0.643*** 
 [0.102] [0.100] [0.145]  [0.169] [0.164]
 Short term nominal interest rate t-1  -0.460*** -0.427***  -0.374***  -0.477***  -0.447*** 
 [0.131] [0.108] [0.123]  [0.142] [0.133]
 ln (Money/Price Level) t-1   ---  0.064  0.056  0.115  0.074 
 [0.105] [0.104]  [0.104] [0.093]
 (investment/GDP) t-1  ---  ---  -0.475 -0.066  0.043 
  [0.274] [0.224] [0.355]
 (Current Account/GDP) t-1   --- ---  ---  ---  0.001 
   [0.002]
  ln(Credit/Price Level) t-1  0.300*** 0.284***  0.284***  0.255***  0.293*** 
 [0.049] [0.069] [0.068]  [0.059] [0.091]
Total Observations  672 672 672  576 421
R-Squared 0.394 0.396 0.401  0.372 0.363




















Notes:  Chg. Loans is the annual change in the logarithm of the ratio of total bank loans to the domestic consumer price index. Chg. Top 



















































































































Notes:  Chg. Loans is the annual change in the logarithm of the ratio of total bank loans to the domestic consumer price index. Chg. Top 

























































































































































































































































Notes: Residuals of change in ln(Real Loans) on the y-axis is the residual from a panel OLS regression of the annual change of the log of 
real loans on country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and lagged changes in the share of income of the top 1 percent of tax units, short-
term interest rates, log of the real money supply, log of the ratio of investment to GDP, and the ratio of the current account to GDP. The 
change in ln(Real GDP) is residual from a similar regression using contemporaneous changes in the log of real GDP and contemporaneous 
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